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The progress of modern physics including the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics has been 
accompanied by problems, argumentations, and thought experiments that directly deal with the act of 
human observation and measurement. However, it may come as a surprise that there is no generally 
accepted and explicit theory of the general observer in physics. Often it has been taken as given that an 
overall model of a human observer is sufficient.  This paper offers a preliminary introduction to the 
perception-psychological arguments that highlight the importance of developing the observer theory 
that joins physics with perceptual psychology. 
Historically, the human perceptual capabilities are grounded in the intertwined evolution of the human 
physiology and the cultural history of mankind. Only an idealized perceptual system (cf. Geisler 1989, 
153) can make observations with optimal efficiency. Natural perception systems just come close to this 
if they have achieved ecologically feasible computational capabilities to match the observation needs 
and the nature of the available information. At the single cell level, receptor physics determine the 
absolute sensory limits of perception and in one specific case it has even been possible to (indirectly) 
relate the sensitivity of an individual receptor to quantum level processes, i.e. photon capture by an 
isolated retinal receptor cell in situ (Baylor et al. 1979, 613). However, for a genuine visual sensation 
to occur, more photons distributed over several rod receptors are required for an optimal 1 millisecond 
test flash to cause a cellular response signal that passes through the neural system and evokes an 
elementary visual sensation of light (Hecht et al. 1942, 196). Furthermore, thermal rhodopsin 
isomerization noise has been shown to affect the absolute visual sensitivity in studies that compared the 
sensory thresholds of animal species at different body temperatures. A clear correlation was been found 
for their absolute visual thresholds and the estimated thermal isomerization rate in the retina (Aho et al. 
1988, 348). 
Errare humanum est: perception is estimation 
It is not known what were the measurement practices before any measurement tools and standards were 
in use.  Without standards, the perceptual classification of object properties is problematic because the 
human senses are very inaccurate in making physical estimations of e.g. color (reflectance), distance, 
or weight but also of time. Hence, the first pre-scientific concepts and symbols in communicating about 
the object world must have relied on the simplest and most reliable perceptions and communication 
symbols that could be shared by a community.  
For example, color names emerged in almost every language (Kay, Maffi 1999, 743) and in a 
systematic order so that it became possible to communicate on object color properties by using basic 
color names, first using symbols for black and white and later for other colors as well. Apparently a 
hierarchy evolved in languages so that, for example, if a language had a term for red, it also had a term 
for black and white but the origin of this hierarchy is still under discussion (Berlin, Kay 1969) (Loreto 
et al. 2012, 1).  
Whatever the way of communicating about the world when no measurement standards were available, 
the symbols used were inherently perception-related. Color names, for example, in the early languages 
were undoubtedly useful although relatively coarse and biased by many contextual factors such as 
lighting, shadows, surface reflections and contrasts.  Based on the findings from language studies we 
may well hypothesize that the black-white (dark-bright) dimension of color classification was among 
the first pre-scientific and shared concepts that could be used to describe natural object properties in a 
standard-like manner.  During this early evolution the subjective versions of the first physical concepts 
evolved. However, without solid references large perceptual attribute estimation errors occurred that 
could be 20% -50% and sometimes even more in estimating object distance, as is still known to happen 
in the modern contexts and even for experienced, professional observers such as pilots (cf. Foyle, 
Kaiser 1991, 314).   
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to speculate about all other possible perceptual candidates 
that could have preceded the first pre-physical measurement standards. There are many of them and the 
concept of distance, for example, could have been based on the capacity of the 3D stereovision and 
scene analysis, walking distance or other motor performance metrics and the use of natural 
environmental references.  
 
In everyday life and over the history of sciences, people have relied on the culturally shared practices 
for quantifying the world. As Kant (1781) put it “Without community, each perception of an 
appearance in space is broken off from every other, and the chain of empirical representations—i.e. 
experience—would have to start all over again with each new object, with its immediate predecessor 
having not the least connection with it or being temporally related to it.” (translation by  J.F. Bennett, 
Internet). 
In other words, our observations and the measurements of the world make sense only if they can be 
shared within a (scientific) community. This sharing became possible when the early and pre-scientific 
communities adopted practical concepts and routines and started using them in situations that required 
an agreement on the amount and quality of objects and materials. In the Indus Valley (Baber 1996, 23) 
and Egypt the first measurement systems for length, time and weight (mass) were created between 
around 5th and 3rd millenium BC (cf. Iwata 2008, 2254) (Encyplopedia Britannica 2012). They paved 
the way to scientific measurements and observation practices. 
What were the consequences of these cultural demands of better observer accuracy on the construction 
of the formal measurement systems and on the emerging physical theories? Was it just a matter of 
improving the observations with better measurement concepts and tools according to the code of the 
good scientific realist as Einstein pointed out:  “The belief in an external world independent of the 
perceiving subject is the basis of all natural science” (Einstein 1954, 266)  
 
 
A silly thought experiment 
The way humans observe the world does not make sense to a frog community. Frogs have strongly 
derivative eyes that do not react to ‘bugs’ that don’t move or show peculiar temporal characteristics 
(Lettvin et al. 1959). With a slight exaggeration and for the sake of argumentation we can say that a 
hungry frog will die in front of a delicious piece of food if the food does not move. Even if the frog had 
a human brain it would not help it to survive unless it had learned to use the neural output from its eye 
to the brain in an intelligent and creative way. But that would not be easy since its derivative eye is not 
spatially homogenous and it is not a linear system. What is lost early in the sensory-neural processing 
phase may not be possible to recover later. We can now ask what kind of physics would such a creature 
– a frog with frog eyes, but a human brain - develop when it could not have relied on a similar analysis 
of object position or size that we humans have learned to use? It would simply be blind to a 
measurement stick that does not move or flicker optimally. The problem becomes less silly if we forget 
the poor frog, and generalize the example to ask: How does an observer of a specific observer class 
perceive the world? How should we describe such an observer? How would the observer characteristics 
guide and constrain the empirically driven physical theories of the world that it can build?  
In the classical Newtonian physics there is a clear-cut division between the object and the observer and 
the assumption that the observer does not have a direct impact on the object. The role of the observer is 
just to record whatever information is available for it to sense of the environment. If the observer does 
not have suitable sensory capacities it is doomed to remain blind to part of the world and only 
measurement tools that extend its sensory domain or spectrum (still remaining within it) can be of help. 
However, in quantum mechanics (some form of) entanglement between the object and the observer is 
unavoidable. The observer and the object together form a system that due to the process of observation 
will adopt a state that is dependent on both of the participating systems. Because of this the nature of 
the observer is critical to the outcome of the entanglement. Quite surprisingly and despite this 
observation-dependent nature of the quantum world, the physicists have generally assumed (often 
without explicit mentioning of it) that the exact evolutionary and adaptive nature of the human or 
animal perceptual system itself has little relevance to the theories of observation. To the best of my 
knowledge no explicit observer-perceiver model has been suggested for the analysis of quantum 
mechanical observations and interactions. 
There is a well-known psychophysical observer theory that is aimed at formalizing and describing the 
observer as capable of performing intelligent and relevant perceptual inferences about the objective 
world, including quantum system contexts. It is a general psychophysical theory that is claimed to 
apply to every perceptual capacity. It offers a means to analyze the decision making potential of 
general psychophysical observers that are confronted with a perceptual problem in a world that has an 
objective description and solution and that can be described in terms of a set of propositions and 
possible observables related to that reality (Bennett et al. 1989, 231). 
Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger did have extensive discussion concerning the observation 
phenomenon. They were early to recognize that the act of observation remains a key problem in 
quantum mechanics and wondered what happens when a system (a human with a measurement 
equipment) observes and - by doing that - interferes with the quantum system. (Wimmel 1992)(cf. 
Lansman 2006, 212). Nevertheless, we don’t know how the cultural-perceptual background of the 
observer and his knowledge community influence the interpretation of the observations and 
consequently, guide the formation of his physical theories.  
The observer as a blind spot of modern physics 
There seems to be a belief among the physicists (cf. Einstein 1954) that the cultural determinants of 
human observation are dwarfed by the power of mathematics, experimental empiria, and human 
imagination. The popular thought experiments by Einstein and Schrödinger, for example, did not 
analyze the observer’s perceptual system characteristics in any depth.  
Heisenberg was aware of the problem of defining the observer and considered the consequences of the 
cultural evolution of physical concepts (Heisenberg 1958, cf. Internet): “Even if we realize that the 
meaning of a concept is never defined with absolute precision, some concepts form an integral part of 
scientific methods, since they represent for the time being the final result of the development of human 
thought in the past, even in a very remote past; they may even be inherited and are in any case the 
indispensable tools for doing scientific work in our time. In this sense they can be practically a priori. 
But further limitations of their applicability may be found in the future.” 
He considered these inherited human concepts as part of a priori knowledge in science. However, these 
considerations neglected the possibility of a general theoretical framework that could point out the 
exact constraints that the human observer (or any observer) carries to the observation context.  
In the special relativity theory (SRT) the observer is defined in terms of an inertial reference frame  
(Einstein 1905) within which he is assumed to preserve his ‘classic’ characteristics and to act as a 
reliable and relatively noiseless perceiver of time, mass, and distance. In this sense, he is considered as 
a real - perhaps even ideal - but at least not disturbingly biased observer located at a particular point in 
the space where he is trusted as a reliable observer of the incidences in his space-time system. If his 
senses are not sufficient then innovative measurement instruments like a clock can be of help. In his 
thought experiments Einstein assumed that the observer is a genuine classical physicist who does not 
suffer from the consequences of perceptual illusions or unconscious inferences (cf. Helmholtz 
1867/1910). Perhaps he took it for granted that such natural perceptual phenomena would only 
complicate the thought experiments, but they would not alter their main messages – and he was right in 
the SRT context. 
The observer-philosophical ideas from Kant were familiar to the fathers of modern physics who were 
puzzled by the role of a priori knowledge in observations. Despite this the observer-related theoretical 
forms of a priori knowledge were not explicitly formulated as it would have been relevant in order to 
fully describe the nature of the observations that involved an observer. A promising later candidate 
approach for explicit observer theory has been suggested by Caves et al. (2001, 1) in the form of 
Bayesian probability theory and based on the general argument that “quantum states are states of 
knowledge” (Fuchs, Peres 2000, 70) even though no explicit observer theory has been included there 
either.  
Hence, it appears that the observer theories in physics have remained loosely human centered or 
human-specific, and one might even see them as somewhat speculative and detached from the 
empirically founded theories of perception. On the other hand there is an abundance of discussions 
under the term ‘consciousness and quantum physics’ or ‘the brain and quantum physics’ (cf. Penrose 
1989) (Stapp 2007) that has continued up to the present time in cognitive sciences, philosophy and 
physics.   
Quantum world of perception 
Von Neumann suggested that for the wave function collapse to occur, a conscious mind of an observer 
is needed to receive information from the measurement (Von Neumann 1955). Heisenberg, however, 
thought that the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual ‘ takes place at the moment of observation 
but without the contribution of the mind of the observer (Heisenberg 1958). He assumed that while 
observation (measurement) causes an interaction between the object and its observer the wave function 
collapse is not caused by the human mind as such. The observer was not explicitly formulated. 
In Schrödinger’s thought experiment the wave form collapse is thought to cause an apparent paradox 
where – without external observation – the isolated cat in the chamber enjoys the superposition 
principle and mysteriously remains potentially both alive and dead – if not observed. But again in this 
example, both the nature of the observation and the observer, to say nothing about the perceptual 
abilities of the cat itself, remain undefined and no explicit theory of the observer is included in the 
analysis. Bohr did consider the whole Schrödinger box as the observer proper that had ‘seen’ or been 
entangled with the destiny of the poor cat already before the imagined experimenter opened the box. 
This was a practical way to define ‘observation’ as a general relationship between two material entities: 
the cat and the box. However, no explicit relationship-theoretical formulation of the ‘box as the 
observer’ was offered. But clearly, if this assumption of the ‘box as an observer’ is accepted it implies 
the idea that any material entity can be an observer. If we then accept the self-evident idea that physics 
is a science that has been constructed by human observers then constructing a physics based on the 
characteristics of a material object such as a box is quite a puzzle. The giants of modern physics 
remained confused by the relationships between a real observer, its environment, and the observer’s 
mind. This is not surprising considering the nature of this vastly complex problem field and the 
fragmented approaches in psychology and philosophy of these phenomena.  
Hugh Everett’s observer 
A notable early exception in this rather fuzzy discourse on observer properties was Hugh Everett, who 
in his unpublished (handwritten) manuscript “Introduction of observers” (Everett 1955, Internet) 
characterized an idealized observer with a memory and also formalized it:  
“We wish now to make deductions about the appearance of phenomena on a subjective level, to 
observers which are treated within the theory. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to identify 
some properties of such an observer (states) with subjective knowledge (i.e. perceptions).”  
He continues: 
 “It will suffice for our purpose to consider our observers to posses memories (i.e. parts of a relatively 
permanent nature, where states are in correspondence with past experience of the observer).” He also 
described what he meant by a “good observation” that is interactive in nature. He did not suggest a 
detailed perceptual characteristic of the observer but clearly assumed that the observer’s memory 
includes the basic perceptual characteristics of an observer. 
Everett introduces the observer state function ψo […A, B, C. …],  where A, B, C ... represent the past 
experiences of the observer, in a temporally ordered sequence. Accordingly, his idea was then to treat 
the interaction of the observer with the object physical system, which process itself becomes a 
definition of an observation. Further on he introduces the objective requirement that in the observation 
process the eigenstate for the observed system remains unchanged and that the observer state change is 
unique to each system state. He offers a formal description to an observation, “an observation upon a 
system that is not in an eigenstate of the observation”, by combining the observer state ψo [ …] and the 
object system state to form a final combined state, which then becomes the observation proper (for the 
formal wave equation solution see the ms by Everett). Now, a question remains, what constitutes an 
observer state? 
Recent findings in quantum mechanics have brought scientists closer to working with direct observer-
object system characteristics when it has become possible to control the state of the observation 
process. The 2012 Nobel price in physics was awarded partly for the achievement in constructing a 
measurement (observation) set-up that entangles the object of measurement in a controllable way 
(Sayrin et al.  2011, 73). The distorting effects of the measurement (observer) system could be adjusted 
by creating a quantum control system that kept the observer effect as weak as possible. No explicit 
observer theory was, however, implied or mentioned there but it is possible to interpret the controlled 
entanglement process to be specific to and a result of the interaction with a certain type of an observer.  
Constructing observer based physics: a thought experiment 
Imagine a possibility to return to the scientific ground zero, to the point in time when no systematic 
physical measurement standards or tools existed. We can construct a theoretical observer Oi(Sj=1,N) 
with N  hypothetical sensory functions Sj that he uses to observe the world. Note that in the case of the 
human observer these functions are not meant to be identical with the sensory (physiological) systems 
that underlie them. The reason to this view is that at the moment there is no applicable theory available 
that would allow unique mapping of physiological processes on these elementary perceptual functions. 
It is not exactly known how many sensory functions there are in the human perceptual system as a 
whole. However, Sj are the de facto perceptual functions that constitute the observer domain and 
observer capacities and which influence the construction of any tangible physical measurement systems 
by the community of observers Oi.   
Accordingly, the original physical measures and concepts and consequently, the present theories in 
physics have been constructed based on these capabilities of the human (homo sapiens, hs) observer 
Ohs(l, m, t). The sensory functions for perceiving length (l), weight (m) and time (t) have made it 
possible to observe only certain types of natural event and artificial experiment and to develop physical 
theories with increasing accuracy in measuring the properties of objects that are within the reach of this 
observation domain and its extensions. The quantum mechanical studies and the constructed quantum 
physical laws are no exception to this since they include Sj as their implicit ingredient in the way 
quantum mass, momentum, and position have been defined. 
It is not reasonable to assume that for any community of observers Oi the evolution of the physical 
theories would have automatically led to the same classical or quantum mechanical findings, equations, 
constants, and laws. Instead, we can imagine alternative hypothetical physics Pi each of which is the 
outcome of the perceptions and actions of a specific observers Oi: 
Oi(Sj) -> Pi  
The present physics Phs reflects the characteristics of Ohs We can now ask, is it reasonable to assume 
that other physics, outside the domain of Phs could be relevant and possible for us to know or even 
speculate about? Assuming that we are indeed interested in them how would Ohs observe and measure 
the phenomena that are based on and predicted by these alternative physics Pi where i ≠ hs ? A 
complete solution cannot be just the widening of the range or spectrum of Shs to extend the observer 
characteristics (sensory functions) within Phs – a step outside the domain of Shs is required. 
 
Another silly thought experiment 
 
Consider a bee that has visual receptors that are sensitive to ultraviolet (uv) light that humans cannot 
see. In order to observe uv, Ohs has learned to use the wavelength concept and constructs devices that 
map the uv recordings (observations) on some of its perceptual system functions Shs.  Typically the 
observations take place in the visual domain and by visual indicators, but of course auditory, tactile or 
any other sensory domain could be used as well.  However, in this process the bee physics Pbee is not 
only mapped on Phs but instead it is assumed that there is a straightforward correspondence between 
Pbee and Phs and that we can trust that the bee’s observer characteristics Obee(Sbee) are not relevant to our 
analysis.  To put it simply, we rely on the human-centric way of defining the world and assume that all 
observers share the same world that has measurable properties. Accordingly, by assuming that the 
physics Phs is sufficient to apply in this context, we can take the bee as a member of the Kantian 
perceptual community, and we can discard ideas of other physics. This is not problematic if we accept 
the hypothesis that the bees live in a world that can be completely described by Phs and that nothing 
valuable is lost when the (now prevalent) mapping Sbee -> Shs is performed. We could then compute 
various sensory functions that the bee might use in its uv vision, map them on Shs,  and everything 
could make sense in Phs. 
 
But what if we want to understand the physics of the bee world proper? Bees have no explicit physics, 
but in a thought experiment we can assume that by their mere survival the bees must have developed an 
implicit theory of physics, Pbee according to which their life and behavior is organized.  However, if 
they could construct an explicit physics its ingredients would not be the same as ours. Of course, the 
problem of observer-based physics does not make any sense if we can assume that Pbee is just a subset 
of Phs. But the question now arises: is there something in the implicit Pbee that our human physics Phs 
does not capture and how we could and should we know it? We don’t know how and exactly why these 
two different physics have evolved but we can assume that the observer characteristics have been their 
drivers.  
 
Of course it is possible to think that there is no meaningful Pbee and that the world presents its kind 
faces to humans and that all relevant bee properties and behaviors can be mapped on Phs. However, in 
quantum physics the situation is complex because there the basic assumption about the character of the 
world and the observation process itself are at test. Hence, repeating this thought experiment for a 
general observer, especially in the quantum realm the problem can become theoretically inspiring. 
Studying these alternative physics is a mathematical journey and adventure worthwhile taking.  
 
How did physical measures emerge? 
John Mollon starts the chapter on color vision and color blindness in his book by stating that ”We are 
all color blind”, referring to the fact that we have ‘only’ trichromacy of vision. It is well known that 
color blind people who cannot see a difference between red and green in controlled conditions, for 
example, can still discriminate between them as object properties on the basis of other naturally 
occurring visual features such as their perceived lightness or other contextual factors. In other words, 
they are able to compensate for their sensory disabilities by using other dimensions of their own 
perceptual space to locate the red and green objects (Mollon 1982, 165). But even in this case the idea 
of ‘object color’ is taken as a given and nobody doubts that that normal and color blind people share 
the same physics. 
Human senses are indeed bad objective measurement instruments, but they have other benefits.  
Typically the Weber fraction in sensory magnitude discrimination tasks varies roughly between 2%-
5%. There are extreme situations where sensory comparison has hyper accuracy like in the case of 
judging the alignment of two vertical lines (vernier acuity) where line displacement of only a few sec 
of arc can be discriminated (Westheimer, McKee 1977, 941). This is about 10 times better resolution 
than the optical Rayleigh resolution limit and the human visual acuity for traditional test targets such as 
Snellen letters, or sinusoidal gratings (Campbell, Robson 1968, 554). In stereovision a disparity of only 
a few seconds of arc cause perception of depth (Westheimer 1992, 205). Hence, it has been beneficial 
for human observers to design instruments that use the more accurate visual comparisons of object 
attributes, like the pointer location on a graphic scale, for example.  
Overcoming the human sensory shortcomings 
Numerous historical notes describe how the human perceptual limitations were compensated for by 
practical physical measures and standards that were used in trade, construction work, and everyday life. 
The core idea in these measurement systems was to utilize the best sensory (visual) functions, 
especially difference perception to allow accurate sensory comparisons. For example, direct estimation 
of object length without a comparison standard would easily introduce a measurement error of about 
10% and even more. The strongest visual illusions, for example, can cause an error close to 50% in the 
estimation of line length. Hence, the Egyptian Royal Cubit (appr. 2700 B.C.) standard for conducting 
visual comparisons was based on the forearm length that was about 52.5 cm and probably made 
possible a measurement accuracy of about 0.2% (1 mm) at one measurement, depending on how the 
visual comparison was conducted.  
Some object properties like liquid volume were difficult to measure and in the ancient China, for 
example, it was accomplished by filling standard wooden barrels with a specified amount of liquid. 
Then by hitting the to-be-filled barrel and the similar standard barrel containing the known amount of 
the liquid and comparing the sounds it was possible to decide when the liquid volumes were equal. In 
other words, the lack of a visual ability to judge the volumes had an auditory solution. In a sense, the 
physics needed for the measurement of volumes was not mature enough but it was possible to 
circumvent this by operating within a physiologically more accurate sensory domain. Quite similarly, 
water clocks were designed to help visualizing the passage of time and to quantify and divide it to 
different intervals (cf. Needham, Joseph et al. 1959) 
One of the most compelling problems of measurement in modern times was the speed of light that was 
impossible to observe directly. Before Louis Fizeau’s ingenious methods using fast rotating wheels 
(1849) the early experiments by Galilei to study it on the earth had failed due to the slowness of the 
visual system. The mechanical arrangements were not sensitive enough to allow the measurements of 
such huge speeds. By avoiding the sensory limitations and relying on the observation of celestial 
phenomena and benefitting from the long distances that light had to travel it had been possible for 
Roemer (1675) to arrive at a good approximation (cf. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light#History).  
The intimate consequences of the human body -centered measures like the Egyptian length standards 
were later seen in the classical architectural systems where they were introduced into the subjective 
world of aesthetics. The harmony system created by the Roman architect Vitruvius (approximately 
70BC-15BC) and used as guideline in building temples consisted of a system of relationships based on 
the relative sizes of the human body parts:  “It is worthy of remark, that the measures necessarily used 
in all buildings and other works, are derived from the members of the human body, as the digit, the 
palm, the foot, the cubit, and that these form a perfect number, called by the Greeks τέλειος.”  
(Vitruvius, Internet). He did not only suggest a harmony system but also defined the navel as the center 
of the human body and the origin of the body-centered coordinate system. Interestingly,  we have 
found brain cells in area 7 of the monkey cortex cells that were activated by movements on the skin 
that apparently had the reference point in the navel of the monkey (Leinonen et al. 1979, 303). 
In summary, at least the following human-centered procedures have been used to overcome the human 
sensory limitations in conducting physical measurements. 
A. Sensory augmentation by relying on a comparison against a standard within a sensory domain 
(vision): human body parts, measurement sticks and gauge pointers. 
B. Perceptual transformation from one sensory domain to another: Chinese volume ‘sound standards’, 
listening to neural spikes in brain recordings, cloud chambers in radiation studies, visualization of 
magnetic and electronic recording data. 
C. Multi-modal combination of sensory domain information: Newton in measuring the speed of sound, 
Hipparcos satellite using relative 3D stereo imaging. 
While these procedures have allowed collaborative measurement (and sharing of knowledge) of object 
properties they have all occurred within the domain of the human observer Ohs and helped to extend the 
limited sensory capacities. Such a use of the human (or any other) observer as reference carries basic 
assumptions about the observer itself and the object of observation, and introduces an irrecoverable 
bias or a priori knowledge to the physical measures, concepts and theories developed. Due to the lack 
of a general theory of observation these biases have so far remained unknown and they have not been 
formally described or they have just been neglected. The early history of modern physics includes 
notions about the perceptual aspects of observation and measurement that are mainly metaphorical in 
nature and have very little to do with real theories of perception. It seems possible that in quantum 
mechanics an explicit general theory of the observer could have theoretical value in constructing 
descriptions of the quantum-level observation processes and the entanglement between the observer 
and the object of observation. 
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